On Thursday, at an event sponsored by the American Society of International Law in Washington, D.C., U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues Clint Williamson identified four ways that governments can marshal efforts and resources to prevent mass-scale atrocities. He intends these efforts to strengthen institutional capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to potential crises.

Amb. Williamson premised his discussion by observing that rule of law and security are essential in restablization, reconstruction, and transitional justice efforts. Mass crimes, such as genocide, are preventable yet require a strengthening of domestic and international institutions.

Four Areas for Institutional Improvement to Prevent Mass-Scale Atrocities

Amb. Williamson framed his discussion as the "four areas" of improvement to prevent mass-scale atrocities. He explicitly identified the first area of improved monitoring systems. The other three areas were less clearly defined in his presentation. I have tried to highlight the four areas, as I understood them, in his speech.

1. Improve Monitoring Systems

The U.S. Department of State has developed a global monitoring system. He did not name it, but the monitoring system is the National Intelligence Council (NIC) Internal Instability Watchlist. The purpose of the system is to identify and track states likely to fail. These states are more likely to experience mass-scale human rights violations. Although the Watchlist tracks near-failed states, the monitoring system only tracks states when they are added to the list. Little tracking is done for states removed from the list or likely to be added to the list. Thus, the system has an inherent bias to watch existing crisis hot spots but not necessarily future or past hot spots. As a result, he argues, the U.S. strategy is reactive rather than preventative.

He recommends augmenting the Internal Instability Watchlist with additional observations targeting specific areas. These observations would be integrated into regular reports for policy planning staff to analyze on an ongoing basis. Field officials would need to be trained on what to look for, how to report the observations, and when to report potential signals of pending crisis. The policy staff then would conduct a warning analysis and funnel the appropriate information to policymakers for review and potential early preventative action. This enhanced and regular reporting function would allow policymakers to identify the vulnerability of state failure earlier in the process when preventative steps could be taken.

Currently, foreign policy officials are trained to examine potential political and economic signs of volatile states. These traditional signs, however, may overlook key non-political and non-economic criteria and warning signals that could serve as triggers for preventative action before the crisis. He did not provide any examples.

He also recommends collecting information from NGOs because they are on the ground, geographically distributed, and present in high-risk situations. This valuable first-hand information can help policymakers understand the dynamics that may be promoting destabilization or a conflict in a state or region.

Amb. Williamson did not address the format of this type of reporting system or how to qualitatively or quantitatively track the warning signals. It seems that maximizing the benefit of such a reporting system would require some degree of consistency in terminology, triggers, and criteria indicative of looming mass-scale human rights violations. At minimum, the international community needs to identify criteria relevant to a risk assessment of mass-scale atrocities and to explore the lessons learned from case-specific characteristics.

2. Engage in Long-Term Planning

The current paradigm is for states, NGOs, and others to put together an ad hoc response to each new crisis. The recurring theme is that each response is transient in nature. Each crisis is treated as if was the first time such an event occurred. After each event, the institutional mechanisms are shut down. In doing so, the institutional strengths of infrastructure, knowledge, and skills requisite to immediate response are lost. As a result, each time, the effort must begin anew without the benefit of past crisis responses.

What we need, he says, is better planning and flexibility to respond.

Here, he gives more specific examples. In his experience at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, he found that it was imperative to capture evidence early in the atrocity or immediately thereafter. As he pointed out, evidence required for prosecution can be quickly destroyed by: (a) the perpetrators trying to cover up the crimes, (b) family members and friends seeking to find loved ones, and -- one he did not mention --(c) the weather and environmental influences.

Long-term planning could ensure adequate availability and training of forensic experts, evidence tracking systems, and storage systems. Long-term planning could also help ensure early action to collect witness statements and to put processes in place to ensure that such statements will be legally enforceable in court.

In his experiences in Bosnia and Iraq and with the ICTY, he found that resources were inadequate for the atrocities that they faced. Even though they had a "sizable team" of investigators and lawyers, they lacked resources to deal with interviewing refugees who could possibly testify.

Further, regional actors with experience could assist in war crimes response. For example, Argentina has helped out the ICTY and ICTR with methodology and practical implementation of evidence collection. Argentina's experience with domestic human rights violations gives it valuable experience and credibility when approaching mass-atrocities situations. He mentioned that strengthened regional actors and regional capacity are particularly needed in Latin America and Africa. He did not mention Asia, and I wasn't able to ask him if the reason for the omission was because: (a) it is implied that Asia has similar needs, (b) if he believes that Asia is less likely to experience human rights violations requiring international intervention as compared to Africa and Latin America, (c) if he omitted Asia because there is no identified regional actor, etc.

3. Take Rapid Preventative Action

The United States, along with other states and international actors, needs a rapid response to high-risk situations as informed by early monitoring, warning analysis, preventive diplomacy, and long-term planning. Diplomatic measures should be used when the signs of preparation for mass human rights violations or mass war crimes are present in order to thwart the perpetrators before they act on their plans. Coordination may be needed by multiple state, regional, international, and local actors. If atrocities are found to have occurred, a rapid response will be necessary to ensure accountability through prosecutions.

One of the difficulties of rapid preventative response is the retention of flexibility for situation-specific characteristics.

4. Implement Transitional Justice

Mass atrocities tend to permeate the political dialogue long after the conflict ends. He used the examples of the past violence in the Great Lakes in Africa, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

He argues that the key lesson learned is the priority of accountability after the end of the conflict. Prosecution and accountability of the perpetrators of mass violence is an essential tool for deterrence. Thus, he advocates for the efficacy of punitive justice. Further, he argues, such punitive transitional justice mechanisms restore confidence in the judiciary and the use of non-violent means to resolve disputes.

He advocates for prosecutions in domestic courts and foresees continued reliance on hybrid courts where domestic capacity is inadequate. He did not mention the International Criminal Court. The United States has not ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC. Amb. Williamson, being at the State Department, likely intentionally omitted this reference rather than make a political statement about the role of the ICC.

About Ambassador Clint Williamson

John Clint Williamson, a career federal prosecutor, serves as the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, a post to which he was confirmed by the U. S. Senate on June 29, 2006. The Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues has available a range of diplomatic, legal, economic, military, and intelligence tools to help secure peace and stability, ensure accountability, and build the rule of law. Additionally, since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the office has been responsible for negotiating the repatriation, to their home countries, of individuals detained by the United States for their involvement in terrorist activities.

Immediately prior to his appointment in the Department of State, Ambassador Williamson served as the Acting Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Relief, Stabilization, and Development at the National Security Council. From 2003 to early-2006, he served as the Director for Stability Operations on the NSC staff. While at the NSC, he was instrumental in developing the proposal for creation of a standing U.S. Government post-conflict response capability, which was realized with the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the State Department in mid-2004.

Early in his posting to the NSC, Ambassador Williamson served a rotation in Baghdad, from April to July 2003, as the first Senior Adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice. From late-2001 through 2002, he served in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations as the Director of the Department of Justice in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), overseeing the justice and prison systems for the UN-administered province.

For 7 years before that, from 1994 to 2001, he worked as a Trial Attorney at the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, Netherlands. While at the ICTY, he supervised investigations and field operations in the Balkans, compiled indictments, and prosecuted cases at trial. Among the cases handled by Ambassador Williamson were those against Slobodan Milosevic and the notorious paramilitary leader Zeljko Raznatovic, aka "Arkan," as well as cases arising from the Yugoslav Army attacks on Vukovar and Dubrovnik, Croatia.

Prior to joining the ICTY, Ambassador Williamson served as a Trial Attorney in the U.S. Department of Justice Organized Crime Section and as an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans.

Ambassador Williamson holds a bachelors degree from Louisiana Tech University and a law degree from Tulane University.

• American Society of International Law
• U.S. Department of State, Office of War Crimes Issues (S/WCI)